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Abstract 
The ability to dynamically create and subsequently 
manage secure virtual organisations (VO) is one of 
the key challenges facing the Grid community. 
Existing approaches for establishing and managing 
VOs typically suffer from lack of fine grained security 
since they largely focus on public key infrastructures 
with statically defined access control lists, or they are 
based upon a centralised site for storage of VO 
specific security information. What is really needed is 
a federated model of security where sites are able to 
manage their own security information for their own 
institutional members, delegating where necessary to 
trusted local or remote entities, as well as defining 
and enforcing authorisation policies for their own 
resources. In this paper we present tools that support 
such capabilities and highlight how they have been 
applied to dynamically create and manage security 
focused VOs in the education domain. We believe that 
this federated VO security model for fine grained 
access to Grid services and resources should be the 
future model upon which security focused Grids are 
based. 
1.   Introduction 
Consider the following scenario: a virtual organisation  
needs to be established which will make available a 
collection of Grid services and data sets across 
multiple sites to a range of users scattered across those 
sites. Access to these resources has strict security 
requirements specific to the virtual organisation being 
required. Sites must be able to decide for themselves 
whether access to their own specific resources should 
be allowed to VO members or not, based upon the 
security information that a remote user presents.  
At present the establishment and management of 
such infrastructures is a fraught process. 
Understanding, agreeing upon and allocating the 
security attributes specific to the VO can involve the 
co-ordination of multiple local/remote system 
administrators, as well as investigators and researchers 
associated with the VO itself. Obtaining VO-wide 
agreement by all parties is also likely to require 
detailed negotiation.   
The ability to delegate the responsibility for 
definition and management of the security information 
specific to a VO is essential for administrators at 
larger institutions or sites involved in numerous VOs. 
Whilst a site administrator might be comfortable with 
delegating responsibility to someone locally, the 
distributed nature of the Grid and multi-site VOs often 
requires that this delegation is made to remote trusted 
individuals. Conceptually this seems like a dangerous 
thing to do, however it is essential if the Grid is to 
scale well and be easy to manage. For example, if a 
remote resource provider requires specific security 
attributes to be provided before allowing access to 
their resource, then they should ideally be in control of 
the distribution of these attributes since they will 
subsequently be enforcing local authorisation 
decisions based upon these attributes. 
To address this requires tools which build on the 
concept of trust. This should not be blind trust since 
this would be naïve and never be accepted by the Grid 
or non-Grid communities, but a limited and tightly 
controlled model of trust based upon site specific role 
hierarchies and delegated trust relationships.  
The Dynamic Virtual Organisations for e-Science 
Education (DyVOSE) project [1] has developed tools 
that support this process building upon and extending 
the existing PERMIS [2] authorisation software which 
we describe. In section 2 we provide an overview of 
existing Grid security models and related work in 
advanced authorisation infrastructures on the Grid as 
well as their limitations for establishing the distributed 
and dynamic management of fine grained VO 
security. In section 3 we introduce the DyVOSE 
delegation model and its associated delegation issuing 
service (DIS) which exploits delegated trust models 
and controlled attribute creation and recognition to 
establish dynamic VOs. In section 4, we describe how 
the delegation model has been implemented and in 
Section 5 we present the educational case study that 
has been used as a proof of concept of the application 
of the DIS service. Finally in section 6 we outline the 
future work and exploitation plans, including how this 
technology could be used in combination with 
Shibboleth for roll out of Grid services across large 
scale federations. 
2. Background to Grid Authorisation 
The first step a Grid user has to take before he can run 
any Grid job is to obtain a (long lived) public key 
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certificate from a recognized Certification Authority 
(CA). Whilst this is no mean task, we don’t propose to 
describe this procedure here, since this is the process 
of authenticating the user and this paper is concerned 
with authorising the user. Once the user has obtained 
his public key certificate, he must extract his globally 
unique Distinguished Name (DN) from it, and get the 
DN registered in the Grid-mapfiles of every Grid 
resource that he needs to access. A Grid-mapfile is a 
simplistic mechanism for authorisation, and merely 
maps the user’s DN into a local user name known to 
that Grid resource. This registration will provide him 
with authorization to run his jobs at each resource site 
under the local user name mapped to him at each 
resource site. The Grid-mapfile lacks the ability to 
specify fine grained access control, or the ability to 
specify conditional rules for granting access, such as 
only between 9am and 5pm or only if requested 
resource usage is less than a certain predefined limit. 
Furthermore, it either requires lots of new local 
usernames to be created for all the different remote 
users who might run their Grid jobs locally, or if 
pooled accounts are used, it is unable to effectively 
differentiate between different remote users. 
Furthermore, any access control mechanism which 
relies solely on listing the names of authorised users is 
not scalable to the proportions needed for ubiquitous 
rollout of the Grid to existing computer users, since 
there are millions of them. Instead we need 
authorisation to be based on groups of users who share 
common characteristics (or attributes) such as: all 
members of project X, all PhD students from 
department Y who are IEEE members etc. This 
attribute based approach to authorisation is scalable to 
global proportions, and when it is coupled to a policy 
based authorisation system that allows a resource 
administrator to specify the rules for who should be 
granted which sorts of access to his resources and 
under what conditions, this gives us the fine grained 
control that we need. 
We already have some procedures for assigning 
attributes to Grid users in the form of the Virtual 
Organisation Management System (VOMS) [14]. This 
creates a separate database for each VO, managed by 
the administrator of that VO. Each VO user is added 
to this database and given the appropriate attributes he 
needs to access that VO. This necessarily places a 
large burden on each VO administrator, since not only 
must he run his own separate database, he also needs 
to manage it and add all the Grid users to it. When we 
consider that most organisations have been assigning 
attributes to users for decades, usually in the form of 
LDAP attributes in organisational based LDAP 
directories, we are bound to ask, “why not leverage 
the existing attribute assigning infrastructure?” There 
are many possible answers to this question, two being 
that the organisation does not want the extra 
administrative burden itself, or the organisation will 
not give a VO manager permission to write to its 
LDAP server in the fear that he may disrupt the 
everyday operations of the organisation. In section 3 
we will describe how we have built a delegation 
issuing service (DIS) that solves these problems and 
significantly reduces the administrative burden on 
everyone concerned, by allowing VO users to delegate 
permissions to each other under the prescribed limits 
and direct control of a delegation policy that is written 
by the organisation. 
Fine grained access control may be achieved by 
adding a policy decision point (PDP) to each Grid 
resource. A PDP reads in the policy that controls 
access to the resource, and when asked by the 
application “can this user who possesses this set of 
attributes have this requested type of access to this 
resource?” it will return a granted or denied decision. 
PDPs have been known about and researched for over 
a decade. Indeed over 10 years ago the ISO access 
control standard [15] specified how they should 
work1. It is only recently that PDPs have been 
experimented with in Grid computing, thanks in part 
to the Global Grid Forum (GGF) which has specified a 
protocol for how a Grid application can call an 
external PDP [16]. In previous papers we have 
described our work in this area [4,5,8,17], in which we 
have plugged the PERMIS PDP into the Globus 
Toolkit, so that authorisation decisions can be made 
according to the policy specified by the resource 
owner. Other researchers have done similarly. Cardea 
[18] is a system built by NASA, that uses an XACML 
based PDP to make authorisation decisions for Grid 
jobs. The WSRF.net platform [19] at the University of 
Virginia also used the GGF protocol to connect a PDP 
to an authorisation infrastructure passing a security 
context and operation name. However most other Grid 
authorisation systems to date use Grid-mapfiles or 
access control lists to determine who should be 
granted access to the Grid resource. The limitations of 
access control lists are similar to those of the Grid-
mapfile, in that they lack scalability, fine grained 
control, and the ability to specify conditions about 
granting access. 
In the next section we will describe how we have 
built a system that simplifies the management of user 
attributes, through dynamic delegation of authority, 
and then uses these dynamically assigned attributes to 
authorise users to access Grid jobs by incorporating a 
PDP at the resource site. 
 
3. Dynamic Virtual Organizations and the 
Delegation Issuing Service 
 
Figure 1 shows how delegation of authority typically 
happens in an organisation. A resource owner (who 
we will subsequently refer to as the Source of 
Authority (SoA)) says who can use the resource in 
which way and signs a piece of paper to authorise this, 
                                                        
1 In the ISO standard the PDP was actually called an Access control 
Decision Function (ADF). It was the IETF who later introduced the 
term PDP. 
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e.g. the Personnel Director signs a form to say that 
person A is now the head of department of the 
organization and can enjoy the privileges of such, or 
the Financial Director may say that person A can sign 
orders up to the value of X thousand Euros, or the 
computer centre manager may sign a form authorizing 
employee B to use a particular computing resource. 
 
Figure 1: Delegation of Authority in an 
Organisation 
  
In some situations the authorized person can 
further delegate (a subset of) his permissions 
downwards, e.g. the head of department may authorize 
a project leader to sign orders up to the value of Y 
euros (Y<X), or a user may allow another user to 
access one of their computer files. There are two 
important points to note here. Firstly the SoA will 
indicate if delegation of authority is possible or not, 
and secondly the delegated privilege must be less than 
or equal to the received privilege. 
In VOs the delegation procedure is made more 
complicated because now we have multiple 
organisations involved. However the delegation 
process should remain the same, whereby people 
delegate to other people the ability to use the resources 
of the VO. Note that the delegation process we are 
talking about here is not the same as the usual Grid 
proxy-delegation process whereby a user delegates his 
permissions to his Grid job by assigning it a proxy 
certificate [23]. The primary difference is that in our 
model the delegate already has its own identity and 
means to authenticate itself, whereas in proxy 
delegation the grid job does not have, and the proxy 
certificate allows the grid job to authenticate itself as a 
job belonging to the user. The job then typically 
inherits the privileges of the user. 
We have implemented the person to person 
delegation model in VOs as described in section 4. 
Because we use the role based (or attribute based) 
access control paradigm, the privileges that are 
assigned and delegated are attributes such as: member 
of group X, or VO work package leader. The SoA 
specifies in his authorisation policy who is trusted to 
assign and delegate which attributes to whom, and 
which privileges are granted to the various attribute 
holders. Further, each organisation in the VO specifies 
its own delegation policy to control the amount of 
delegation that may take place between its employees. 
A user is ultimately only granted access to VO 
resources according to the intersection of these two 
policies. 
Figure 2 shows the overall delegation and 
authorisation model with its key components and main 
actors. (We have only shown two different 
organisations in the figure, the Service Provider (SP) 
and the user organisation, but the model is extensible 
to any number of SPs and user organisations.)  
 
Figure 2: The Delegation/Authorisation Model 
 
In the delegation model, the SoA for each resource 
writes his own authorisation policy and stores it in the 
local repository (step 1.) Each User Site manager 
writes the delegation policy for her site (step 2) and 
stores it in her local repository. The Delegation 
Issuing Service (DIS) reads in this policy at 
initialisation time. Users may dynamically delegate 
privilege attributes amongst themselves using the DIS, 
providing it is in accordance with the site delegation 
policy (step 3). When a user submits a grid job (step 
4), the user’s delegated and certified attributes may 
optionally accompany the grid job (the push mode). 
The grid gateway calls the authorisation decision 
system to validate any user attribute certificates that it 
received from the user (step 5), and any additional 
ones that the authz system may pull itself from the 
user site (step 6). The authz system returns to the grid 
gateway only valid attributes that were delegated in 
accordance with both the user site delegation policy 
and the SoA’s policy (step 7). The grid gateway asks 
for an authorisation decision for the user’s job (step 
8), based on the user’s validated attributes and the 
access control policy, and if granted, allows the job to 
access the grid resource (step 9) 
A VO is made up of multiple resources owned by 
multiple SoAs. Until a SoA recognizes the existence 
of a VO and grants it members access rights to his 
resource, there is no VO from the resource’s point of 
view. It is the SoA’s authorisation policy that says 
who is in the VO, who is trusted to assign attributes to 
others throughout the VO (i.e. delegation), and which 
attributes grant which privileges to his resources. To 
facilitate the establishment of a VO each SoA must 
remain in full control of their resources, and need to 
make their own trust decisions when specifying the 
authorisation policy that grants access to their 
resource. In short, site autonomy must be upheld. If a 
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SoA does not trust any remote site manager to 
delegate the privilege attributes to users at that site, 
they can always directly assign them themselves. The 
SoA is therefore the author of the complete 
authorisation policy that grants access to their 
resource, and they can decide who to trust or not. The 
complete authorisation policy comprises two key 
components: Attribute Assignment Policy (AAP) and 
an Access Control Policy (ACP). 
 
3.1 Attribute Assignment Policy (AAP) 
The AAP says who is trusted to assign which 
attributes to which groups of users. This policy can 
also specify whether further delegation of these 
attributes is allowed or not, thus increasing scalability 
of attribute management. For example, a typical policy 
might say that site manager at site X is allowed to 
assign the following set of attributes to users who 
belong to site X, and that these users can further 
delegate their attributes to other site members. The 
most trusting policy would say that a particular 
manager is trusted to assign any attribute to anyone, 
with unlimited delegation thereafter. The least trusting 
policy would only trust the manager to assign one 
attribute to a very small group of users, with no 
subsequent delegation. A zero trusting policy will 
require the SoA to directly assign attributes to users 
himself. Note that this policy is under the direct 
control of each resource SoA, so they each only need 
to be as trusting as they want to be. 
 
3.2 Access Control Policy (ACP) 
The ACP says which attributes are needed in order 
to be granted which types of access to which Grid 
resource, and under what conditions. For example, a 
typical policy might say that members of VO abc (i.e. 
have the abc VO membership attribute) can retrieve 
certain data sets from a Grid database. A more 
scalable solution is to specify what attributes or roles 
that already exist in member organisations inherit the 
privileges of VO abc members. This eliminates the 
step of explicitly issuing the new attributes, thus 
further simplifying and increasing the scalability of 
attribute management.  
The combined AAP/ACP policy is optionally 
digitally signed by the SoA (this prevents it from 
being tampered with) before it is stored in the local 
repository. The authorisation decision system reads in 
the SoA’s authorisation policy when it is initialised by 
the Grid application or gateway, and will enforce this 
policy when users try to access the Grid resources 
belonging to the SoA. The Grid application or 
gateway can be tightly coupled to the authorisation 
decision engine and call it via an internal API, or can 
be loosely coupled and call it via the GGF SAML 
authorisation protocol [16] or its successors. The 
authorisation decision engine comprises two main 
components: the credential validation service (CVS) 
which ensures that all attributes have been issued 
according to the attribute assignment policy (AAP), 
and the PDP that ensures that all resource accesses are 
granted according to the access control policy (ACP). 
Assuming that the SoA trusts the site manager at 
User Site to delegate the privilege attributes to other 
users at the User Site (and optionally for those users to 
delegate these attributes further amongst themselves – 
step 3) the SoA will add this site manager to his AAP. 
Whatever the resource owner says becomes the 
policy for the resource. Note that in the traditional 
access control list approach the SoA needs to maintain 
the list of trusted people himself. Our approach allows 
the amount of work done by the SoA to be reduced 
and distributed to others, but requires the resource 
authorisation decision system to be more sophisticated 
in order to:  
1. Discover the attribute assignments issued by 
people other than the SoA 
2. Build delegation chains from these 
assignments 
3. Authenticate the assignments as originating 
from a specific person or entity 
4. Validate the delegation chains according to 
the SoA’s policy; in particular, make sure that 
it does not end up trusting a delegated user 
more than it trusts the user site manager. 
Considering these requirements we chose to 
implement the attribute assignments as a set of 
attributes inside X.509 Attribute Certificates (ACs) 
[20], because they solve the requirements as follows:  
1. They can be stored in LDAP or other 
repositories and can be looked up by the 
name of the holder, the issuer or any of their 
contents [24]. 
2. Delegation chains can be built recursively by 
using the identities of the subjects as the next 
issuers in the chain. This is not possible with 
either SAML [21] or XACML [25], since the 
identities of issuers and subjects are specified 
differently. 
3. They are digitally signed by their issuers, and 
public key cryptography proves authenticity 
of the X.509 ACs. 
4. X.509 provides rules for chain validation, 
and by applying role (or attribute) hierarchies 
as well we can ensure that a delegated 
attribute is less than or equal to a delegator’s 
attribute. 
In addition, X.509 ACs have a compact binary 
encoding and usually outperform similar string 
encoded constructs [22]. These features are sufficient 
to be able to build dynamic VOs, but before looking in 
detail at how a dynamic VO can be constructed, we 
introduce the Delegation Issuing Service (DIS) that 
helps to optimise VO delegation of authority.  
The primary drawback with the process of 
dynamic delegation is that delegation chains can 
become very long, e.g. SoA → Site Manager → Alice 
→ Bob → Charlie etc. Thus it can become time 
consuming and processor intensive for the 
authorisation decision engine to reconstruct the 
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delegation chains and validate that the attributes have 
been delegated correctly according to the authorisation 
policy of the SoA. To address this we have introduced 
a Delegation Issuing Service (DIS) into the model to 
make the delegation chain processing more efficient, 
and in addition, to ensure that the site delegation 
policy is enforced at each step in the delegation 
process. The DIS is a service that issues X.509 
attribute certificates (ACs) on behalf of the requester, 
according to the configured delegation policy.  
The advantages of using a DIS are several. Firstly, 
the DIS can support a fully secure audit trail and 
database, so that there is an easily accessible record of 
every AC that has been issued and revoked throughout 
the organization. If each manager and user were 
allowed to independently issue their own ACs, then 
this information would be distributed throughout the 
organization, making it difficult or impossible to 
collect, being possibly badly or never recorded or even 
lost. Secondly, the DIS can be provided with the 
organization’s delegation policy, and apply control 
procedures to ensure that a delegator does not overstep 
their authority by issuing greater privileges to 
subordinates or even to themselves, than the 
organization’s policy allows. Thirdly, a delegator does 
not need to hold and maintain their own private 
signing key, which would be needed if the delegator 
were to issue and sign their own ACs. Only the DIS 
needs to have an AC signing key. This is a very 
important feature for organizations that use 
mechanisms other than PKIs for authentication. Once 
Shibboleth becomes the preferred mechanism for 
authentication to Grid jobs, as seems increasingly 
likely, then very few Grid users will have their own 
PKI key pairs. Finally, when the DIS is given its own 
AC by the site manager, it can replace the entire set of 
ACs in an AC delegation chain and therefore decrease 
the complexity of AC chain validation. The AC chain 
length will always be of length two when the DIS 
issues the ACs to end users (Site Manager → DIS AC 
→ end user AC – see Figure 3) whereas it would be of 
arbitrary length when the delegators issue the ACs 
themselves. Also less AC revocation lists (ACRLs) 
will need to be issued – only the DIS will need to 
issue an ACRL rather than each delegator. This will 
further simplify AC chain validation. Note that a full 
audit trail of the logical delegation chain is still 
available, since the DIS adds an “issued on behalf of” 
field into all its issued ACs, in accordance with the 
2005 edition of X.509. 
4. DIS Implementation 
The DIS is a web service that can be called by any 
other web service. In order to provide a user friendly 
web browser interface, it has been deployed with an 
Apache Axis Web Service front-end written in PHP 
which forms a proxy between the user (web browser) 
and the DIS service itself. Mutual SSL authentication 
takes place between the Apache server (acting as the 
DIS client) and the DIS web service, and the Apache 
DIS client invokes the DIS Java library through SOAP 
calls. This allows the Apache DIS client and the 
Tomcat-served DIS server to be hosted on separate 
resources if required, although for the purposes of our 
explorations they were mounted on the same machine.  
 
Figure 3: Delegation Chains with the DIS 
 
The user may authenticate to the Apache server in 
whatever method a site prefers. In our experiments we 
used the Apache authentication module 
mod_auth_ldap in which usernames and passwords 
are stored in a backend LDAP server. The Apache 
DIS client is a trusted proxy of the DIS server, 
consequently the DIS server will issue ACs on behalf 
of the authenticated user, providing the user has 
sufficient permissions according to the site delegation 
policy.   
 
Figure 4: DIS Web Browser Interface 
 
When using the DIS, an authenticated user may 
search the local LDAP for the user they wish to 
delegate an attribute to, and then pick the attribute 
from the presented picking list, as shown in Figure 4. 
The user then sets a validity date for the delegation, 
and finally grants a level of further delegating ability 
to the delegate as shown in Figure 4. In Figure 4 a 
Glasgow user (CN=Anthony, OU=DCS, O=Glasgow, 
C=GB) is being delegated a VO role (EdTeamN). 
Upon submission of this request to the DIS, the local 
delegation policy is checked to make sure the 
delegator (the person who logged into Apache – the 
delegator’s ID is not shown on the above web page) is 
allowed to delegate the EdTeamN attribute to 
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Anthony, and then the AC is either issued or an error 
message is reported. 
Previous PERMIS tools allowed any user to issue 
any AC to anyone, with validity checking being 
carried out by the authorisation system at the resource 
site. The latter step must still be carried out at the 
resource site, even when a DIS is being used, since a 
user may have a valid credential at his home site that 
is not trusted at a remote resource site. However, the 
DIS allows more control to be exerted over the 
delegation process, and gives the delegator immediate 
feedback as to whether his delegation is authorised or 
not by his home site. 
The web browser based front end to the DIS 
allows AC issuing and delegation to be performed 
anywhere in the world by anyone who can 
authenticate to the Apache server. So if a researcher is 
away from his laboratory and wants to authorise a 
colleague to run an experiment on his behalf, he can 
issue an AC to his colleague via the DIS, delegating 
him the appropriate attributes for the appropriate 
duration of his absence. It also allows VO attribute 
management to be delegated to other administrators in 
the PMI with the minimum of difficulty. For example, 
consider a VO where it has been agreed amongst the 
institutions that access to some resources is dependent 
on some low-privilege attribute called ‘BasicUse’, 
which through the PERMIS authorisation policy will 
allow access to less resources than, say, the 
“Employee” attribute. A resource provider who wishes 
to participate in the VO may offer his resource to VO 
users provided they hold the ‘BasicUse’ attribute. In a 
scenario such as this, users need to be given the 
“BasicUse” attribute to present to a resource site. This 
can be achieved in several ways. Either a resource 
owner (SoA) can trust the user site administrator to 
delegate the “BasicUse” attribute to her users, by 
including her as a trusted AA in his PERMIS 
authorisation policy, or a user site administrator may 
trust the SoA to assign the ‘BasicUse’ attribute to her 
users. In the former trust model, the administrator may 
choose to issue the “BasicUse” attributes herself, or 
empower the users to dynamically do this using the 
DIS. In the latter trust model, the user institution must 
create a new user ID for the SoA, give him 
authentication credentials to the DIS Apache client, 
and then allow him to delegate the “BasicUse” 
attribute to their local users. A third approach, which 
relies on the hierarchical RBAC model, is for the SoA 
to define the ‘BasicUse’ attribute as subordinate to 
one or more existing attributes e.g. “Employee” that 
have already been allocated to users. In this case the 
users will inherit the privileges to access the SoA’s 
resource through possession of their existing 
attribute(s).  
In all of these scenarios the precept that sensitive 
user information should be held at the user’s 
institution is still valid. The attribute(s) that are more 
relevant for accessing external resources may be 
safely allocated by either the local administrator (who 
has ultimate authority at the user site) or by the 
external resource provider (who is allocating an 
attribute useful for accessing his resource). In both 
cases the attributes are still stored at the user’s home 
institution. If the number of users to be assigned 
‘BasicUse’ is large, then the local administrator may 
wish to allow the remote SoA to allocate this attribute 
to save himself work, safe in the knowledge that the 
remote SoA can only ever act within the bounds of the 
delegation policy that he has set.  
Note that with the third approach, role-mapping 
between institutions must be agreed before this kind of 
inherited authorisation can take place, as the 
“Employee” attribute may have different names in 
each institution of the VO. PERMIS software that 
allows multiple attribute mappings is currently being 
developed, but for the DIS case study, the attributes 
were simply given the same name at each institution. 
The scenario described above has been implemented 
during the second year of the DyVOSE project and is 
described in the next section. 
The software prerequisites for implementation of 
the DIS are relatively straightforward to configure and 
interface. However in order to realise the secure 
issuing of ACs at a user site that are deemed to be 
valid at a SP site, a unified underlying PKI is required. 
This is so that AC signatures created at one site can be 
validated at another site. The DIS service ships with 
an example working configuration that assumes a 
unified PKI and a single root CA, but porting the DIS 
to support an established local independent PKI 
security infrastructure is a non-trivial step that requires 
careful public key certificate management.  Detailed 
information on how multiple PKIs can be supported is 
given in [1].  
 
5. Case Study 
The National e-Science Centre (NeSC) at the 
University of Glasgow teaches Grid computing to 
advanced MSc students. This course has been run for 
the last two years. In the first year, the student 
programming assignment (developing secure Grid 
services to search and sort the complete works of 
Shakespeare) was used to (successfully!) show how a 
static PMI could be defined and used based upon 
technology such as Globus toolkit version 3.3 [3], 
Condor (www.cs.wisc.edu/condor) and PERMIS [2]. 
The experiences and results of this activity are 
presented in [6, 7, 9, 11].  
The programming assignment associated with the 
second year of teaching Grid Computing focused upon 
the dynamic establishment and usage of a PMI in a 
bioinformatics related project. The case study 
separated the eleven students that took the Grid 
computing module into two different research teams: 
one team analyzing protein sequence data and the 
other analyzing nucleotide sequence data. The 
students were required to implement a Globus-based 
Basic Local Alignment Search Tool (BLAST) 
bioinformatics application to perform the analysis, 
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which was to run across a Condor pool located at 
NeSC in Glasgow. Before they could perform the 
analysis, the students were expected to develop a Grid 
client to retrieve the data from a PERMIS protected 
data service (BlastData) in Edinburgh. Depending 
upon the team that they were in, either protein or 
nucleotide sequence data would be returned 
respectively. These data sets were then used as input 
to a Globus GT3.3 based Grid service which the 
students implemented locally at Glasgow. These 
services parallelized the BLAST application over the 
NeSC Condor pool. Diagrammatically the assignment 
and associated infrastructure is given in Figure 5.  
We note that for simplicity, the genomic databases 
used to BLAST against were pre-deployed across the 
Condor pool. The students Grid BLAST services 
themselves were protected through PERMIS so that 
only members of the appropriate student team were 
able to invoke their respective BLAST services. The 
two different authorization policies were pre-defined 
and deployed in the local NeSC LDAP server by the 
teaching staff. The students were able to secure their 
Grid services through including the appropriate 
authorization policy in their deployment descriptor file 
as described in [5]. 
 
Figure 5: Dynamic PMI Case Study 
Infrastructure 
 
In the initial implementation the Edinburgh SoA 
used the Glasgow DIS service to issue attributes 
within the Glasgow PMI for the two roles (EdTeamP 
or EdTeamP) needed to gain access to the Edinburgh-
based BlastData Grid service, i.e. the SoA was 
delegated the privilege by the Glasgow Administrator 
to assign subordinate roles within the Glasgow role 
hierarchy. In this scenario the Glasgow Administrator 
delegated the privilege to the Edinburgh SoA to issue 
attribute certificates to roles below externalStudent.  
In the above model the service provider (here the 
Edinburgh BlastData provider) is able to select via the 
DIS which users (from Glasgow) should be allocated 
the specific role needed to access and use his service. 
In this model, the Edinburgh service provider has fine 
grained control of the attributes and specific users who 
should be given them. For smaller tightly controlled 
VOs, this model might be beneficial. For larger scale 
VOs however it might be better for the service 
provider to simply delegate this responsibility to an 
appropriate remote administrator, e.g. in this scenario 
the Grid computing course director at Glasgow might 
be delegated the privilege to issue 
EdTeamN/EdTeamP roles to students at Glasgow. 
Both of these scenarios are fully supported by the DIS 
and have been explored in DyVOSE. 
Through creation of a VO specific role within the 
Glasgow role hierarchy by the Edinburgh SoA, 
Glasgow students were subsequently able to access 
and return the appropriate sequence data sets for input 
to the BLAST service. To understand how this was 
achieved, we consider the basic interactions that take 
place when a Glasgow student Grid client attempts to 
retrieve data from the Edinburgh Grid BlastData 
service. The user certificates that were issued to all 
students undertaking the Grid Computing course were 
from a local certification authority established at 
NeSC Glasgow for teaching purposes. It is based on 
openSSL. These certificates were used to generate 
proxy certificates used by the Grid client through the 
Globus Security Infrastructure (GSI) [13] in order to 
interact with the secure Edinburgh BlastData service. 
Based upon the authorization system associated with 
this service, the associated Edinburgh PERMIS policy 
is queried to make an authorization decision. This 
policy includes information that states that a remote 
repository exists (the Glasgow LDAP) server, where 
user ACs may be found. The PERMIS CVS then 
concurrently queries both its local repository and the 
remote Glasgow LDAP server to pick up the ACs of 
the current user. In this case, the Glasgow LDAP 
identifies that an AC exists and returns it to the 
Edinburgh CVS, in order for it to validate the 
delegation chains. The Edinburgh CVS checks the 
signature associated with this AC and once satisfied it 
comes from a trusted source, the attribute itself is 
checked (EdTeamN/EdTeamP) by the PDP and the 
appropriate data set returned. Note that if the attribute 
associated with the Glasgow student does not match 
the one required in the access control policy, e.g. the 
student was in the nucleotide team and was attempting 
to access protein data then the access request will be 
denied. 
Of the 11 students that undertook the Grid 
Computing module and associated programming 
assignment this year, several successfully completed 
all of the assignment. All of the students that built the 
Grid client were able to return data from Edinburgh. 
As such, this education domain application of the DIS 
has shown the proof of concept for how a service 
provider (BlastData) is able to either securely create 
or make use of dynamically issued attribute 
certificates at remote sites which subsequently allow 
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for fine grained authorization decisions on their 
resource. It is our intention to explore this service 
across a wider range of other projects in numerous 
other domains where fine grained security is needed 
[10, 12].  
 
6. Conclusions 
The models and implementations presented in this 
paper have the potential to revolutionise the way Grids 
are built and particularly the way in which dynamic 
VOs are established and managed. Decentralised 
models are a better and more scalable model for VOs 
than centralised VO models, and more aligned with 
the true vision of the Grid in supporting dynamic 
collaborations and resource sharing. 
The formation of any VOs depends upon trust. In 
this paper we build upon a basic model of trust and 
show how controlled delegation of authority allows 
for rapid VO formation and fine grained authorisation. 
Through the DIS we have shown how service 
providers can delegate authority to remote trusted 
administrators to dynamically issue roles/attributes 
needed for access to/usage of their services. Other 
models where the remote service providers themselves 
are trusted by local administrators to issue 
roles/attributes to local users have also been explored 
with the DIS. Both models have their own advantages 
and disadvantages depending on the VO requirements 
and the levels of trust between the parties. Time will 
tell which approach to using the DIS has most take-up 
by the Grid community.   
We note that the DIS service is also highly 
complementary to Shibboleth which is being rolled 
out across UK academia. Shibboleth assumes a core, 
largely static set of attributes which identity providers 
may release to service providers to make authorisation 
decisions for access to protected resources. Pulling 
VO specific attributes dynamically created through 
DIS via Shibboleth will harmonise the access and 
usage of Grid and non-Grid resources. 
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